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Abstract 
Using a laboratory experiment in the field, we examine how the choice architecture of 
framing a social dilemma – give to or take from a public good – interacts with a policy 
intervention that enforces a minimum contribution level to the public good. We find that 
cooperation is significantly higher in the give frame than in the take frame in our standard 
public goods experiment. When a minimum contribution level is introduced, contributions are 
significantly higher in the take frame since contributions are crowded out in the give frame 
but crowded in in the take frame. Our results therefore stress the importance of choosing the 
frame when making policy recommendations. 
Keywords: Choice architecture, Framing, Public goods, Minimum level, Experiment, 
Ethiopia. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper focuses on the design of institutions that foster cooperation in the provision of 
local public goods, for example local environmental quality. Using lab-in-the-field 
experiments, we investigate the role of framing and minimum levels in public good provision 
in rural Ethiopia. These are two prominent institutional factors that policy makers can use in 
their role as choice architects.1 Thaler and Sunstein (2009) coined the expression nudging to 
describe that the policy makers, i.e., choice architects, have the possibility to affect people’s 
behavior and still respect freedom of choice, i.e., libertarian paternalism. The objective of our 
paper is to investigate the interaction effects between framing and minimum levels in a non-
student and non-Western subject pool. Although previous experiments have shown that other 
institutions such as monetary punishment and exclusions are promising institutions to increase 
cooperation (e.g., see overview in Chaudhuri, 2011), we firmly believe that framing and 
minimum level are the institutions that are possible and easy to affect by policy makers, 
especially in developing countries. To our knowledge, this is the first study that 
experimentally explores the interaction between framing and formal institutions such as 
minimum levels in public good games. 
Policy makers can affect cooperative behavior by changing the frame of a given cooperation 
problem, by choosing whether the activity should be designed in terms of giving to or taking 
from a public good. We frame public goods in terms of giving or taking and investigate the 
impact on cooperative behavior. Previous experimental literature on framing effects in social 
dilemmas has mostly focused on understanding the difference in behavior, and the results 
show more cooperation in give frames, or no difference,2 despite the fact that individuals face 
the same fundamental economic problem in both frames (e.g., Andreoni, 1995; Cox, 2015; 
Dufwenberg, et al., 2011; Fosgaard et al., 2014; Khadjavi and Lange, 2015). However, our 
focus is on the relevance of framing for policy design, in particular concerning the interaction 
between framing and minimum levels in public good provision. Minimum levels are often 
imposed in order to secure some provision of a public good. For example, in developing 
countries it is common to provide local public goods directly through mandatory community-
based labor exchange, with provision of the public good enforced without a formal institution, 
                                                 
1 A neutral design does not exist. Any design choice a decision maker makes influence people’s behavior, from 
the order of food choices on a menu to whether CO2 compensation of a flight is by default included or not 
included in the flight price. 
2 For a summary of previous experiments on take and give frames, see Gächter et al. (2014). See also Cookson 
(2000). 
through peer-pressure and social norms (Olken and Singhal, 2011; Ostrom, 1991). A 
minimum level should increase the total provision of the public good since any free rider is 
forced to contribute at least the announced minimum, and this in turn might make conditional 
cooperators increase their contribution since they want to cooperate if others cooperate and 
vice versa (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001). However, the minimum level could also result in 
crowding out, i.e., that individuals contribute less to the public good when the minimum level 
is imposed than when it is not imposed because the minimum level might send a signal of 
distrust to intrinsically cooperative agents. In this case the minimum level entails a “hidden 
cost of control” (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Ziegelmeyer et al., 2012).3 Results from previously 
conducted experiments of minimum levels using the standard give frame, i.e., subjects are 
asked to give to the public good, are mixed regarding the effect of minimum levels on public 
good provision. For instance, Andreoni (1993) and Gronberg et al. (2012) find a positive 
effect of a minimum level on public good provision using concave payoff functions, Eckel et 
al. (2005) implement a dictator game with a charity as recipient and find that a minimum level 
crowds out donations to the charity when it is framed as a tax, and Kocher et al. (2016) use a 
linear public goods game and find instances of both crowding out and crowding in following 
the introduction of a minimum level. 
The decision maker has the important role of being a choice architect. In order to use framing 
as a policy design tool it is helpful to distinguish between situations where it is possible to 
meaningfully change the frame of a given cooperation problem and situations where the frame 
is simply a structural aspect of the cooperation problem. In the former case, changing the 
framing can be a policy tool in itself and hence an important design problem for a choice 
architect. For instance, cooperative behavior can be encouraged by using positive language 
(e.g., emphasize the positive effect of doing something which is good for the community) or 
negative language (e.g., emphasize the negative effect of doing something which is bad for 
the community), and the policy maker can also affect the design of the activity itself such that 
it involves either giving to or taking from a public good.4 In the latter case, understanding 
framing as a structural aspect of the cooperation problem could be useful in the selection of 
other policy tools such as minimum levels. It is very important for policy makers to know 
                                                 
3 See for instance Deci (1971, 1975) and Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012) for general discussions on crowding 
out of intrinsic motivation and control aversion. 
4 This is closely related to the literature on choice architecture. For instance, framing has been found to affect 
savings behavior (Brown et al., 2008), energy conservation (Gromet et al., 2013), and the impact of conditional 
incentives on worker productivity (Hossain and List, 2012) and teacher performance (Fryer et al., 2012). 
whether minimum levels work differently for give and take frames when considering future 
choice architecture designs.5 This is indeed the key motivation for exploring the interaction 
between framing and minimum levels. 
Framing can influence how subjects conceive their own actions and others’ actions (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1981). In terms of our public goods game, actions are kind in the give frame 
(“to give”) but unkind in the take frame (“to take”), and this possibly affects behavior. For 
instance, we might expect higher public good provision in the give frame because of 
reciprocity (since subjects reciprocate kind actions with kindness; Cox et al., 2008, 2013); or 
because of “warm glow,” if subjects derive more utility from doing something good than from 
refraining from doing something bad (Andreoni, 1995).6 However, if subjects care about what 
is socially appropriate, then we might instead expect higher provision in the take frame (since 
it is a less socially appropriate action to take than to give; Krupka and Weber, 2013). The 
minimum level could have an effect along some or all of these dimensions. It could for 
instance act as a signal or reference point, thus affecting subjects’ view of what is socially 
appropriate and also their belief about what others are doing. These effects might differ 
depending on whether public good provision is framed as give or take. Moreover, the 
minimum level might be perceived as more lenient in the take frame since it is binding from 
above (“take at most”) and thus someone who considers taking less than the imposed 
maximum might feel unaffected by this constraint; conversely, by contributing more than the 
imposed minimum in the give frame, one might feel that the part of the contribution stipulated 
by the mandatory minimum (“give at least”) was a forced choice. Thus, the predicted net 
effects are difficult to pin down theoretically. Our experiments provide empirical evidence on 
the relationship between framing and minimum levels. 
Our results are based on lab-in-the-field experiments in rural Ethiopia, where the subjects 
were farm household heads actively engaged in a number of public-good-like decisions such 
as environmental rehabilitation and the maintenance of local infrastructure. Thus, we also 
contribute to extending the conventional analysis of cooperation to a non-student and non-
                                                 
5 It is possible that both dimensions of framing as policy are applicable to the same cooperation problem. For 
example, the problem of labor contribution to a local public good can be considered as a structural give frame, 
while the problem of over-harvesting from a local public good can be considered as a structural take frame.  It is 
however possible to highlight the positive and negative consequences of individuals’ actions in each of the above 
problems.  
6 See also Cubitt et al. (2011), who find that subjects condemn free riding more strongly in give situations than in 
take situations. 
Western subject pool (e.g., Henrich et al., 2010). This is especially important since societies 
across the world differ substantially in terms of social organization, trust, fairness norms, and 
also in the nature of day-to-day cooperation problems.7 Results from developing-country 
subject pools like ours could therefore be particularly important both in examining the 
generalizability of experimental findings and in drawing conclusions about social dilemmas 
prevalent in such places. Moreover, our results provide information for the choice architecture 
of public goods projects. Fosgaard et al. (2014) were the first to implement a public goods 
game framed as either take-from or give-to in a non-student sample, namely a large-scale 
sample of the Danish population. Interestingly, their treatment effects differ from the majority 
of experiments using conventional student samples in that they find more cooperation in the 
take frame. We extend the analysis further by conducting experiments with more than 300 
farmers in Ethiopia. We find strong effects of framing and minimum levels on cooperation. 
More precisely, we find that cooperation is significantly higher in the give frame than in the 
take frame in our standard public goods experiment. When a minimum contribution level is 
introduced, contributions are significantly higher in the take frame since contributions are 
crowded out in the give frame but crowded in in the take frame. Overall, the highest level of 
cooperation is observed in the give frame with no minimum level. Our results show the 
importance of framing for choice architects. Furthermore, our results could be important 
inasmuch as they point to situations where policy makers can increase the efficiency of 
interventions with simple and cost-efficient framing techniques combined with formal 
institutions such as minimum levels in public good provision. These interventions are easier 
to implement than other institutional features such as monetary punishment or exclusion. The 
rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the experimental design, Section 
4 presents the results, and we provide concluding remarks in Section 5. 
2. Experiment 
2.1. Design 
The primary focus of our paper is to investigate the effect of (i) framing phrased as either give 
to (GIVE) or take from (TAKE) the public good combined with (ii) a minimum level. We 
begin with a description of the framing of the public goods and then we explain how the 
                                                 
7 See for instance Henrich et al. (2001) for cross-cultural comparisons of economic experiments in small-scale 
societies. See also Herrmann et al. (2008) and Vieder et al. (2015). 
minimum level was implemented and finally how we tested for the effect on contributions to 
the public goods in both frames. 
We implement a linear public goods experiment based on the design developed by 
Fischbacher et al. (2001), which in addition to eliciting unconditional contributions to public 
goods also uses the strategy method to elicit contributions to public goods conditional on 
others’ average contributions.8,9 We begin with a description of the public goods using the 
give frame, i.e., how much a subject would like to give10 to a public good. This is the 
common way to phrase contributions in public goods experiments. Subjects are matched into 
groups of four, each with an endowment of 10 Ethiopian birr and the possibility to contribute 
any integer amount c from 0 to 10 Ethiopian birr to the public good. To facilitate 
understanding, we choose to use the real currency directly rather than an experimental 
currency.11 The marginal per capita return from the public good is 0.5, i.e., a contribution of 
one unit results in 0.5 units of income for each of the four group members. This can easily be 
explained to the subjects by explaining that the total amount contributed to the public good is 
doubled and then split equally between the subjects. Since the marginal per capita return is 0.5 
and the social marginal per capita return is 2, it is a dominant strategy for a payoff-
maximizing individual to contribute nothing to the public good. However, it is socially 
optimal to contribute the whole endowment. The payoff for subject i is given by 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 10− 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 0.5∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗4𝑗𝑗=1 .   (2) 
The Fischbacher et al. design employs the strategy method. Subjects make two types of giving 
decisions, one unconditional and one conditional. In the unconditional decision, subjects 
decide how much they wish to give to the public good without knowing anything about 
                                                 
8 For a discussion on the validity of using the strategy method to elicit cooperative preferences, see, e.g., 
Fischbacher et al. (2012). For a general discussion on the policy implications of results from public goods 
experiments, see Gächter (2007). For other experiments based on this design, see, e.g., Fischbacher and Gächter 
(2010), Herrmann and Thöni (2009), Kocher et al. (2008), Martinsson et al. (2013), and Martinsson et al. (2015). 
See also Rustagi et al. (2010) and Kosfeld and Rustagi (2015) for interesting applications to the management of 
forest commons in Ethiopia. 
9 We chose a design with linear rather than concave payoff functions (e.g., Andreoni, 1993) since it facilitates 
understanding and the use of the strategy method, which we think is important. This means that the minimum 
level is set above rather than below the Nash equilibrium of zero contribution, which makes the welfare effect of 
the minimum level more salient. 
10 To facilitate understanding, we deliberately use the word “give” instead of “contribute” when we write about 
the GIVE and TAKE treatments.  
11 In our Ethiopian case, this worked particularly well since the value of Ethiopian birr matched well with the 
opportunity cost we intended to use. The experiment with two stages was calibrated to give on average almost a 
daily salary (30 birr). 
anybody else’s contributions. In the conditional decision, each subject decides on the amount 
to give conditional on the average amount given by the other three group members. This is 
implemented by each subject stating how much she/he would give to the public good for each 
possible average amount given (in integers) by the others in the group ranging from 0 to 10. 
To make the decisions incentive compatible, the unconditional decision will be payoff 
relevant for three randomly selected group members, and by using the average unconditional 
amount given (rounded to the next integer) by them, the amount given by the fourth member 
is determined as his or her conditional giving matching that specific average amount. Payoffs 
are then calculated based on these amounts.  
In the take frame, the decision is framed as how much a subject would like to take from the 
public good. We follow standard procedures in the framing literature when we implement this 
frame (e.g., Andreoni, 1995; Fosgaard et al., 2014). In this treatment, subjects are not 
endowed with 10 Ethiopian birr as in the give frame. Instead, the public good consists of 4×10 
= 40 Ethiopian birr and subjects decide on the (integer) amount w from 0 to 10 birr that they 
wish to take from the public good. The payoff function for subject i is given by 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 0.5�40− ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗4𝑗𝑗=1 �.   (3) 
The incentives are exactly the same across GIVE and TAKE since equations (2) and (3) 
describe the same underlying payoff function and only differ in how it is framed. 
In addition to testing for framing effects, we investigate the effect of introducing a minimum 
level in each frame. In the give frame, subjects must give at least the announced minimum 
level of 2 Ethiopian birr, which corresponds to 20% of the endowment. We follow Andreoni 
(1993) and present the minimum level as a restriction on individuals’ choice set. For instance, 
conditional giving is elicited by subjects making eleven giving decisions (one for each 
possible integer average amount given by the others in the group); when the minimum level of 
2 Ethiopian birr has been implemented, subjects make nine giving decisions instead of eleven 
and they know that they are not allowed to give less than 2 Ethiopian birr. In the take frame, 
where the procedures are exactly the same with the exception that the game is presented as 
take-from rather than give-to the public good, subjects must not take more than an announced 
amount of 8 Ethiopian birr, and hence leave at least 2 Ethiopian birr in the public good.  
In the experiment, subjects participate in sessions with public goods experiments framed as 
TAKE or GIVE and within each session they complete two stages. The first stage (Baseline) 
is a standard public goods experiment. It is followed by a second stage (MCL) which is a 
public goods experiment with an imposed minimum contribution level.12 We use stranger 
matching, i.e., they are re-matched with three new group members in the second stage, and as 
described above a subject makes two types of decisions (unconditional and conditional) in 
each stage. They are paid for their decisions in both stages but learn nothing about the 
decisions of others in the group until they are paid some days after the experiment. 
2.2. Procedural details 
The experiment was conducted in 2013 in rural Ethiopia. It was a separate module of a 
household survey on community forestry that covered 15 villages scattered across the four 
major regions of the country. We ran experiments in eight of these villages.13 In each region 
we first randomly selected two villages from each region. Then one of the two villages was 
randomized into the give treatment and the other into the take treatment.14 With 
randomization of treatments at the regional level, we obtain a balanced sample where the 
regional mix of subjects is similar across the treatments. This is to ensure that our results are 
not driven by regional differences, which could be quite large given the wide (and diverse) 
geographical area covered. 
In each village, households were randomly selected for participation in the survey. The 
household heads were interviewed in their respective houses in private by a trained 
enumerator. At the end of the household survey, they were asked if they would like to 
participate in an economic experiment. All household heads covered in the survey agreed to 
participate in the experiment. The experiment was conducted face-to-face similar to in for 
example Henrich et al. (2001). The above described public goods experiment was clearly 
described to the subjects, who after a number of comprehension questions completed both 
stages of the experiment. Subjects were informed that similar experiments had or would take 
                                                 
12 We do not test for order effects and the reason is that the order we impose is natural in most cases, in the sense 
that we are interested in the effect of a minimum level when subjects are experienced with the baseline, which is 
a voluntary contribution mechanism in the form of either take-from or give-to the public good. This is what 
typically happens in reality: a public goods problem is identified and a remedy is sought and implemented. 
13 The 15 villages in the household survey were selected on the basis of certain criteria, including the extent of 
forest cover, product diversity, and year and purpose of establishment of the community forestry program. 
14 Randomization of treatments within a village was not feasible since the experiments had to be rolled out over 
the course of several days and thus mixing treatments within a village would risk that subjects learn about this 
variation. 
place in other households in their village and that they would be randomly and anonymously 
matched against other household heads in their village. They were also informed that 
payments would be distributed on a specific date and that this procedure was the same for 
everybody else participating in the experiment.15 The enumerators were trained to carefully 
explain and demonstrate the structure of the experiment according to a script, and they knew 
the importance of doing so in a neutral manner.16 A total of 360 subjects participated in the 
experiment, 180 in each treatment. 
3. Results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample. As can be seen, about 90% of the 
household heads are males and over 50% are literate. Farming is the predominant activity for 
the households and the total size of parcels for own cultivation is slightly over 4 acres. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of subjects (household heads) separated by treatment. 
 GIVE TAKE H0: No difference 
between GIVE and 
TAKE (p-value*) 
 
Age 49.0  46.0  0.03  
Male 87.2% 90% 0.40  
Can read and write 51.1% 50.6% 0.92  
Farming is main 
activity 
91% 91% 0.86  
Trust Kebele 2.51  2.46  0.56  
Off-farm labor 23% 28.3% 0.23  
Household size 7.0  6.8  0.40  
Parcel size (acres) 4.56  4.17  0.38  
Has savings 19.4% 23.3% 0.37  
Remittances 7.8% 10.6% 0.36  
Observations 180 180   
Note: *Mann-Whitney U test. Trust Kebele: Kebele is the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia and the 
question is phrased, “Most people who live in your Kebele can be trusted” (1 = agree fully, 5 = disagree fully); 
Off-farm labor: at least one household member worked off the farm at least once during last year; Parcel size: 
the size of the household’s land used for own cultivation; Remittances: the household received a remittance 
during last year. 
 
When comparing the socio-economic characteristics between the treatments, there is no 
statistical difference based on non-parametric tests, except that subjects in the TAKE 
                                                 
15 We established a credible procedure through the involvement of the Kebele leader in the organization of the 
experiments, and also by running the experiments, which were approved by the national government, through the 
Ethiopian Development Research Institute. 
16 The instructions are available from the authors upon request. 
treatment are statistically significantly younger at the 5% level (49.0 years vs. 46.0 years; 
Mann-Whitney U-test; p = 0.03). However, we do not consider this average difference of 3 
years to be of any economic significance. Overall, the randomization of subjects into 
treatments seems to have worked well. 
Next, we turn to the impact of framing on unconditional contributions. For ease of 
comparison, we will mostly refer to “contributions” also in the take frame, and by this we 
mean the effective contribution, i.e., 10 – wi, where wi is the amount withdrawn from the 
public account. The results are presented in Table 2. Subjects in the GIVE treatment 
contribute on average 5.02 birr out of the endowment of 10 birr, i.e., 50.2%, whereas the 
average contribution in the TAKE treatment is 40.0%. In standard one-shot linear public 
goods games, average voluntary contributions (and normally a give frame is used) usually 
range from 40% to 60% of endowments (see, e.g., Chaudhuri, 2011). The difference between 
the two treatments is significant at the 1% level (Mann-Whitney U-test; p < 0.01). 
Furthermore, there is a substantial difference across treatments in the share of subjects opting 
for free riding by contributing nothing and full contribution, respectively. In the GIVE 
treatment, 2.2% of the subjects contribute nothing and 7.8% contribute their full endowment. 
In the TAKE treatment, 19.4% opt to free ride and only 1.1%, i.e., two subjects, contribute the 
whole endowment. At both ends of the spectrum – zero and full contribution – there is a 
highly significant difference in proportions between the treatments (Kruskal-Wallis tests; p < 
0.01 in both cases). These results are in line with other experiments and thus we replicate the 
pattern of higher contributions in the GIVE frame using a non-standard subject pool, namely 
farmers in Ethiopia. Interestingly, the stark difference in proportion of free riders between the 
frames is remarkably similar to the results in Andreoni (1995). 
 
Table 2. Effect of framing on unconditional contributions in the baseline. 
 Average Contributes 
nothing 
Contributes 
everything 
GIVE (n = 180) 5.02 (2.15) 2.2% 7.8% 
TAKE (n = 180) 4.00 (2.44) 19.4% 1.1% 
p-value < 0.01a < 0.01b < 0.01b 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. n = number of subjects. a Mann-Whitney U test. b Kruskal-Wallis test. 
 
Result 1. The average contributions are significantly higher and the proportion of free riders 
is significantly lower in the GIVE frame. 
We implement a minimum level in both frames and the results are presented in Table 3. In the 
GIVE treatment, the minimum level has a negative effect on contributions: the average 
contribution decreases from 5.02 birr to 4.46 birr, i.e., by 0.56 birr, which corresponds to 5.6 
percentage points in terms of the initial endowment, and this difference is significant at the 
1% level (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p < 0.01). Conversely, in the TAKE treatment the 
average contribution increases from 4.03 birr in the baseline to 4.74 birr after the introduction 
of the minimum level, which corresponds to a 7.1 percentage point increase (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test; p < 0.01). The contributions are significantly different between the two 
treatments at the 10% level (Mann-Whitney U-test; p = 0.08). 
 
Table 3. Effect of a minimum level on unconditional contributions (separated by treatment). 
 Baseline MCL Difference p-value 
GIVE (n = 180) 5.02 (2.15) 4.46 (1.98) -0.56 < 0.01b 
TAKE (n = 177) 4.03 (2.44) 4.74 (2.06) +0.71 < 0.01b 
p-value < 0.01a 0.08a < 0.01a  
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. n = number of subjects. a Mann-Whitney U test. b Wilcoxon signed-
rank test (H0: Difference = 0). Three subjects in the TAKE treatment report unfeasible contributions in MCL and 
we thus exclude them from the analysis. 
 
Result 2. When a minimum level is introduced in the GIVE frame, contributions to the public 
good decrease significantly; in contrast, when a minimum level is introduced in the TAKE 
frame, contributions increase significantly. Thus, the framing has a substantial effect on the 
efficiency of minimum levels. 
We provide more detailed information regarding the effect of the minimum level in Table 4, 
which is a disaggregation of the results in Table 3. For the baseline contributions, subjects are 
split into three categories: below, at, and above the minimum level of 2 birr. For contributions 
in the second stage, i.e., when the minimum level is implemented, subjects are separated into 
those who precisely match the minimum level of 2 birr, and those who contribute above it. 
This results in six possible contribution profiles, and thus we can obtain richer information on 
how different groups of subjects react to the minimum level and how these reactions differ 
between the two treatments. The top two rows of Table 4 make it clear that the effect along 
the extensive margin is much stronger in the TAKE treatment. Here, the minimum level has a 
direct effect on 22% of the subjects who contributed less than 2 birr in the baseline, compared 
with only 4% of the subjects in GIVE. Interestingly, however, in the TAKE treatment about 
half of the subjects who contributed less than 2 birr in the baseline, i.e., 10% of the total 
number of subjects in this treatment, substantially increase their contribution in the second 
stage, on average from 0.6% of the endowment in the baseline to 57.1% when the minimum 
level has been implemented. Hence, they are strongly crowded in. Looking at the bottom two 
rows of the table, we can see that the majority of subjects contribute more than 2 birr in the 
baseline in (89% in GIVE and 74% in TAKE). When the minimum level is introduced, some 
of these subjects reduce their contribution all the way down to the postulated minimum and 
this effect is similar across treatments. Still, the majority of subjects in both treatments 
voluntarily contribute above the imposed minimum level and herein lays the main source of 
difference between the treatments, since subjects in the GIVE treatment on average decrease 
their contributions whereas those in the TAKE treatment instead increase their contributions. 
 
Table 4. Disaggregation of the effect on unconditional contributions. 
Contribution 
profile GIVE  TAKE 
        
(Baseline, MCL) Share of 
subjects 
Baseline 
contr. 
MCL 
contr. 
 Share of 
subjects 
Baseline 
contr. 
MCL 
contr. 
(<2, =2) (2%) 0.33 2.00  (12%) 0.14 2.00 
(<2, >2) (2%) 0.50 3.75  (10%) 0.06 5.71 
        
(=2, =2) (4%) 2.00 2.00  (2%) 2.00 2.00 
(=2, >2) (3%) 2.00 4.50  (2%) 2.00 6.00 
        
(>2, =2) (8%) 4.90 2.00  (10%) 5.82 2.00 
(>2, >2) (81%) 5.60 4.90  (64%) 5.21 5.56 
Note: The share-of-subjects columns show the frequency of subjects who contributed according to the profile 
described in column one. The cells show the average contribution to the public good in the baseline and in MCL 
among subjects who behave according to this pattern, for GIVE and TAKE, respectively. 
 
Using the full sample, we summarize subjects’ reactions along the intensive margin by 
looking at the extent to which the average subject is crowded in, by voluntarily increasing 
their contribution, or crowded out, by voluntarily decreasing their contribution, when the 
minimum level is imposed. We calculate the average difference between subjects’ baseline 
contribution and their contribution when the minimum level has been imposed, counting only 
the contributions that are above 2 birr, which is the minimum level in both cases, but 
averaging over all subjects in each treatment.17 Subjects in the GIVE treatment are crowded 
out by an average of 0.63 birr (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p < 0.01) while subjects in the 
                                                 
17 Mechanically, we follow Falk and Kosfeld (2006) and proceed as follows. First, baseline contributions below 
the minimum level are manually adjusted up to this level. Then we test whether the average difference between 
MCL and baseline contributions is different from zero using all subjects (the average difference is zero for 
contribution profiles in rows 1 and 3 of Table 4). A positive difference implies crowding in and a negative 
crowding out. 
TAKE treatment are crowded in by an average of 0.31 birr, yet this effect is only significant at 
the 10% level (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests; p = 0.08). These two effects are statistically 
different from each other at the 1% level (Mann-Whitney U test; p < 0.01), which means that 
subjects act differently along the intensive margin in GIVE and TAKE. Among the subjects 
who already contributed above 2 birr in the baseline, 56% are crowded out and 17% are 
crowded in in the GIVE treatment, whereas 38% are crowded out and 35% are crowded in in 
the TAKE treatment. The average crowding-out effect in GIVE within this subsample is 0.85 
birr, which is significant at the 1% level (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p < 0.01). In the TAKE 
treatment, the crowding-in effect we found when looking at the full sample does not exist 
within this subsample and instead there is a weak but insignificant crowding-out effect of 0.19 
birr (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p = 0.49). 
Result 3. The minimum level significantly crowds out voluntary contributions to the public 
good in the GIVE frame but weakly crowds in contributions in the TAKE frame. 
The other part of the public goods experiment elicited conditional contributions following 
Fischbacher et al. (2001). Subjects stated their contribution for each possible average 
contribution of the other group members and we can thus investigate the impact of framing 
and minimum levels on subjects’ contribution strategies. Figure 1 displays average 
conditional contributions in the baseline for both treatments. The positive slope suggests that 
subjects are on average conditional cooperators, i.e., they contribute more when the other 
group members contribute more. The contribution schedule in the GIVE frame consistently 
lies above the schedule in the TAKE frame, which is in line with the theoretical prediction 
since a given outcome, e.g., the others contribute nothing to the public good, reveals less 
generosity in TAKE than in GIVE and is thus met with comparatively more negative 
reciprocity. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the main effect of introducing the minimum level. Interestingly, the 
minimum level seems to have little overall effect on subjects’ contribution strategies; only in 
TAKE and at low levels of others’ public good contributions is there a marked difference, but 
the schedules gradually converge. Table 5 provides further information. In column 1, 
individual contributions in the baseline are regressed on others’ average contribution, a 
treatment dummy, and an interaction term between the two.18 The estimated intercept – own 
                                                 
18 We report from OLS regressions in Table 5 but a Tobit model gives similar results. 
contribution conditioned on the others contributing nothing to the public good – is 2.68 birr in 
the base category, i.e., the GIVE treatment. 
 
Figure 1. Average conditional contributions in the baseline (separated by treatment). 
 
Note: One subject in the GIVE treatment and three subjects in the TAKE treatment either did not complete the 
contribution table or reported unfeasible numbers. These four subjects are excluded from the analysis. 
 
The TAKE dummy identifies the difference in constant compared with the GIVE treatment. 
The difference is 1.01 birr less, which is significant at the 1% level. The interaction term 
captures the difference in slope compared with the GIVE treatment. It is statistically 
significant (steeper in TAKE) but the point estimate of 0.06 is small in both absolute 
economic terms and compared with the estimated slope in GIVE, which is 0.52 birr. By and 
large, the strong framing effect regarding baseline contributions to the public good thus 
prevails when we assess subjects’ contribution strategies by allowing them to condition their 
contribution on the other group members’ contributions.19 In column 2, the specification is the 
same but concerns contributions after the minimum level has been implemented. 
                                                 
19 We can see in the table that there is a positive effect of others’ average contribution on individuals’ own 
contribution to the public good and this indicates that subjects on average are conditional cooperators. Another 
way to investigate this is to look at the correlation between subjects’ unconditional contributions and their beliefs 
about others’ unconditional contributions, which is similar to the information we get from the contribution table 
except for the additional uncertainty that subjects face concerning the accuracy of their beliefs. Regressing 
unconditional contributions on beliefs yields a positive effect that is significant at the 1% level in three of the 
four treatment combinations (it is insignificant in the TAKE treatment with a minimum level). 
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 Figure 2. Average conditional contributions in GIVE (n = 168). 
 
Note: Twelve subjects in this treatment reported unfeasible conditional contributions after the introduction of the 
minimum level and are therefore excluded from the analysis. 
 
Figure 3. Average conditional contributions in TAKE (n = 172). 
 
Note: Eight subjects in this treatment reported unfeasible conditional contributions after the introduction of the 
minimum level and are therefore excluded from the analysis. 
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The main difference compared with the regression in column 1 is that both the TAKE dummy 
and the interaction term are insignificant, which means that there is no difference in 
contributions between the two treatments. The regression in column 3 is a difference-in-
difference specification and captures how the effect of introducing a minimum level compares 
across the GIVE and TAKE treatments. The MCL dummy and the interaction with the slope 
variable (Others) capture the effect of the minimum level in the GIVE treatment. The effect 
on the constant is an insignificant -0.26 birr and the effect on the slope is significant but not 
very large. The point estimate on TAKE×MCL captures the difference-in-differences in 
constant between TAKE and GIVE: when a minimum level is introduced, the effect on the 
constant is 0.74 birr stronger in TAKE than in GIVE. Interestingly, however, the difference in 
the effect on the slope goes in the other direction: when the minimum level is introduced, the 
effect on the slope of the contribution schedule is 0.09 birr weaker in TAKE than in GIVE. 
 
Table 5. Effect of framing and minimum level on cooperative preferences (OLS regression). 
Dependent variable: 
conditional contribution 
Baseline 
(1) 
MCL 
(2) 
Full sample 
(3) 
Constant 2.68 (0.16)*** 2.45 (0.15)*** 2.70 (0.17)*** 
Others 0.52 (0.03)*** 0.58 (0.03)*** 0.53 (0.03)*** 
TAKE -1.01 (0.25)*** -0.30 (0.24) -1.02 (0.26)*** 
TAKE × Others 0.06 (0.04)*** -0.03 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) 
MCL   -0.26 (0.16) 
MCL × Others   0.05 (0.02)** 
TAKE ×MCL   0.74 (0.22)*** 
TAKE ×MCL × Others   -0.09 (0.03)** 
Observations 3916 3096 6800 
- Clusters 356 344 340 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on individuals (in brackets). Others is the average contribution of the 
others in the group. TAKE is a treatment dummy and MCL is a dummy for the second stage public goods game 
(when the minimum level is imposed). The dependent variable is individual i’s conditional contribution. *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. Four 
subjects either did not fill out the contribution table or reported unfeasible contributions in the baseline and these 
subjects are excluded from the analysis in (1). A further sixteen subjects made a similar mistake after the 
introduction of the minimum level and thus sixteen and twenty subjects are excluded from the analysis in (2) and 
(3), respectively. 
 
Result 4. The framing has a substantial impact on subjects’ contribution strategies. When 
subjects can condition their decisions on the other group members’ contributions, they 
contribute significantly more in the baseline GIVE frame than in the baseline TAKE frame. To 
some extent, the framing also has an effect on the efficiency of minimum levels on subjects’ 
contribution strategies.  
Using the Fischbacher et al. design further enables us to classify subjects into contribution 
types following the convention introduced by these authors. We thus consider subjects as 
either conditional cooperators, free riders, hump-shaped contributors, or others. We define 
types as follows: conditional cooperators either have a weakly increasing conditional 
contribution schedule, or their Spearman’s rho (correlation with the others’ average 
contribution) is positive and significant at the 1% level; free riders always contribute the 
lowest amount allowed; hump-shaped contributors display a positive Spearman correlation up 
to their highest contribution, whereafter the correlation is negative (both correlations should 
be significant at the 1% level); others do not fit into any of these categories. The distribution 
of contribution types is displayed in Tables 6 and 7. We can see that the distribution is stable: 
the baseline type distribution is not significantly different between the GIVE and the TAKE 
treatment (Kruskal-Wallis test; p = 0.70), and, furthermore, 76% of subjects in the GIVE 
treatment and 74% in the TAKE treatment are classified as the same type in the baseline as in 
MCL (observations on the diagonal in either table).20 
 
Table 6. Distribution of contribution types in GIVE (n = 168). 
           MCL  Min-level    
 
Baseline 
 Conditional 
cooperators 
(“free riders”) 
(=2) Hump-shaped Others Total 
 Conditional 
cooperators 
56.55% 1.19% 0.00% 9.52% 67.26% 
 Free riders 
(=0) 
0.00% 0.60% 0.00% 0.00% 0.60% 
 Hump-
shaped 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.19% 1.19% 
 Others 0.60% 0.60% 1.79% 19.05% 30.95% 
 Total 66.07% 2.38% 1.79% 29.76% 100% 
Note: Type definition follows Fischbacher et al. (2001). Conditional cooperators: increasing schedule or positive 
Spearman’s rho (correlation with others’ average contribution) at 1%; Free riders: contribute the lowest amount 
allowed; Hump-shaped: positive (negative) Spearman correlation at 1% up to (beyond) their highest 
contribution. Twelve subjects in this treatment report unfeasible conditional contributions after the introduction 
of the minimum level and are therefore excluded from the analysis. 
 
                                                 
20 Thus, in neither treatment is the distribution significantly altered following the introduction of a minimum 
contribution level (Kruskal-Wallis tests; p = 0.70 in GIVE and p = 0.18 in TAKE). However, the MCL type 
distributions do differ between frames (Kruskal-Wallis test; p = 0.04). 
Table 7. Distribution of contribution types in TAKE (n = 172). 
           MCL  Min-level    
 
Baseline 
 Conditional 
cooperators 
(“free riders”) 
(=2) Hump-shaped Others Total 
 Conditional 
cooperators 
47.09% 0.00% 0.00% 13.37% 60.47% 
 Free riders 
(=0) 
1.16% 1.74% 0.00% 0.00% 2.91% 
 Hump-
shaped 
1.74% 0.00% 0.00% 2.33% 4.07% 
 Others 5.23% 0.58% 1.16% 25.58% 32.56% 
 Total 55.23% 2.33% 1.16% 41.28% 100% 
Note: Type definition follows Fischbacher et al. (2001). Conditional cooperators: increasing schedule or positive 
Spearman’s rho (correlation with others’ average contribution) at 1%; Free riders: contribute the lowest amount 
allowed; Hump-shaped: positive (negative) Spearman correlation at 1% up to (beyond) their highest 
contribution. Eight subjects in this treatment report unfeasible conditional contributions after the introduction of 
the minimum level and are therefore excluded from the analysis. 
 
Result 5. The distribution of contributor types is stable. Neither across the two frames in the 
baseline nor within each frame with respect to the implementation of a minimum contribution 
level do contributor type distributions differ significantly. 
4. Conclusion 
Contribution to public goods is an important issue for policy makers. In their role as policy 
makers, however, they have the possibility to act as choice architects. Two institutional 
factors they can affect fairly easily are whether to frame public goods in terms of giving or 
taking, and also whether or not to impose a low compulsory minimum level of contributions. 
These factors are easier to implement than other institutional features such as monetary 
punishment and exclusion. Our focus is on the relevance for policy design and we conduct our 
public goods experiments as a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural Ethiopia. The objective of 
our paper is to investigate the interaction effects between framing and minimum levels. 
We find a strong frame dependency in the efficiency of minimum levels. Overall, we find the 
highest contributions in the give frame without a minimum level. In the standard public goods 
experiment, the give frame results in significantly higher contributions than the take frame. 
When the minimum level is introduced, the contribution levels between the frames are 
reversed and the levels are significantly higher in the take frame. Cooperation is crowded out 
in the give frame but crowded in in the take frame.  
The paper makes several contributions. First, some real-life cooperation problems might 
exhibit the aspects of the give frame whereas other problems might instead resemble the take 
frame. For example, the problem of labor contribution to a local public good can be 
considered a give frame, while the problem of over-harvesting from a local public good can 
be considered a take frame. Our results indicate that introducing minimum levels in order to 
curb underinvestment in local public goods is an efficient policy only in the latter case, 
despite the fact that individuals face the same underlying economic problem in both frames. 
Furthermore, this finding highlights the potential importance of framing lab experiments in 
accordance with the structural aspects of the real-life cooperation problem that we as 
researchers are trying to address. This is a question of external validity and could be relevant 
to the literature that examines institution formation, policy interventions, and the general 
impact of incentives on cooperation in public goods experiments, since these results almost 
exclusively rely on experiments using the give frame (rather than the take frame). Second, 
changing the framing can sometimes be a policy tool in itself. Our results indicate that the 
success of a policy intervention, like the introduction of minimum levels in public goods 
provision, can depend on the manner in which the situation is framed (e.g., whether 
cooperative behavior is encouraged by focusing on aspects of doing good or avoiding harm). 
To the extent it is possible, policy makers in the role as choice architect should thus use the 
best frame in a given context and for a given policy intervention. 
Framing and minimum levels are cheap and easy-to-implement local-level policy options, and 
they could be especially important in situations with comparatively weak centralized formal 
institutions. However, a potential drawback with a minimum level is the substantial 
heterogeneity in subjects’ reactions to it. It is important to acknowledge the fact that the high 
proportion of free riders found in experiments using students as subjects has not been 
replicated to the same extent using non-student samples, making the case for pure efficiency 
gain of a minimum level weaker but a negative effect of crowding out more possible. We find 
a high share of conditional cooperators, which policy makers need to account for in their 
choice of policy instruments. For example, Rustagi et al. (2010) and Kosfeld and Rustagi 
(2015) implement novel experiments in rural Ethiopia and document the importance of 
conditional cooperation for successful management of forest commons. By using the design in 
Fischbacher et al. (2001), our study together with those two papers and the large-scale study 
by Fosgaard et al. (2014) contribute to improve our knowledge about people’s cooperative 
preferences in non-student subject pools. 
There are potentially large gains in using simple policy regimes, especially in developing 
countries. Framing and minimum levels in public good provision are two such options. We 
analyze their interaction and impact on public good provision, looking at the net effects of 
implementing these institutions. The behavioral effects in our experiments are likely shaped 
by a combination of several mechanisms and an interesting avenue for future research would 
be to pin them down in more detail. 
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